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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Case No. 920492-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Priority No. 2 
-vs-
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992) which permits a defendant in a district 
court criminal action to petition the Court of Appeals for reversal 
of a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules and/or constitutional provisions 
are determinative or may be determinative of the outcome of this 
appeal: U.C.A. § 77-29-1, (1980, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
prosecute this case because Mr. McGrath was not brought to trial 
within 120 days pursuant to Utah Code Ann* § 77-29-1. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Since this involves interpretation of a 
statute, no deference should be given to the trial court, The 
matter should be reviewed de novo. 
2. Whether Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed 
because it is not supported by sufficient evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. All the evidence and the inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn therefrom will be construed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. 
3. Whether Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed 
because his right to a fair trial was seriously prejudiced by 
extensive and pervasive prosecutorial misconduct. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Defendant must demonstrate that the 
prosecutor's misconduct constituted plain error. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App. 1991). 
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in 
failing to declare a mistrial after the jury admitted to using non-
record evidence during its deliberation upon the verdict. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This should be reviewed pursuant to a 
"plain error" inquiry. 
5. Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel that was guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW, Whether the defendant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel as -\ natter of law. 
* i the tri a J court, cumin *.-. bb • "Oi" in receiving 
evidence which was irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial to Mr. 
McGrath '<" eviso •* 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, The court must re v i cw 1 h is i S M M - »; i 
determine if the trial court abused its discretion In admitting the 
e*. .'. •. . 
7 :he trial court commit reversible error incorrectly 
charging the jury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue should he reviewed pursiniit to 
a "plain error" inquiry. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial Distri ct Coi n: t i i I 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Appellant was 
convicted I The! 1 I jy Ueceiving Stolen Property, a second degree 
felony. Appellant was sentenced to a term of one to fi fteen years, 
said sentence to i un concurrently with any sentence Appellant was 
serving t t::i me 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant's parole on an earlier conviction was violated, and 
he was taken into custody on February 21, 1991. He was later 
charged by Information with possession of a deadly weapon and theft 
by receiving. A pre-revocation hearing was held at the Utah Board 
of Pardons, and Defendant was held in prison pending adjudication 
of the aforesaid charges. On March 4, 1991, Defendant filed a 
notice and request for disposition of pending charges with the 
warden of the Utah State Prison. (R.O.A. 82, 302-307) On August 
2f 1991, the criminal information was filed against Defendant 
(R.O.A. 8) On February 6, 1992, Defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the information claiming its prosecution was barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953 as amended). (R.O.A. 80) On March 10, 
1992, Judge Richard H. Moffat denied said Motion. (R.O.A. 100-
101). 
Defendant was bound over to District court on a single count 
of theft by receiving. All other charges lodged against Defendant 
were quashed at the preliminary hearing stage. (R.O.A. 293). 
At trial, Glenda Steadman was called as a witness by the 
prosecution. (Tr. June 1, 1992, pp.134-158). Her testimony at 
trial was different from an interview that she had previously given 
to police. The police interview was introduced by the prosecution, 
over objection of defendant's counsel, for impeachment purposes. 
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It was argued by defendant's counsel that such impeachment evidence 
was inadmissible - trial irposes in that it could not. be used as 
substantive evidence, a^ -i w^s tota:-y irrelevant to the rase 
prosecutor, in hif closing argument, argued the impeachment 
evidence ii,\. - • - !•? subs ta titiv*^  evidence. (Tr. June 3, 
1992, p.26, p.28), Defendant's counsel objected, and the court 
denied the objection. (Tr. June 1, 1992, p.48). 
At t i i a I , MMi.u'ted i ujties MI il he 1 i rins-.r r i fit ni i; I pnda 
Steadman' earlier telephone call with police were given to the 
j > w trie taped conversation. These writers • opies were 
taken ^f *-he jurors into the jury 
deliberations, even though they were not received into evidence. 
(Tr J une defendant's counsel moved for a 
mistrial - . June . i ** *. The moti on was denied. (Tr 
June 3, 1992, p,4:n . 
One Co ft1 y K M nil was J * "- i mother, 
Martha Vert, and her sister, Tiffany Vert, as * - ir visited 
her home January 28, 1991, tn look «it i marquis cut diamond ring, 
and who was carr y i n<j «i • 1i«:< 111 < , ?:-«te pi (i a n i <;i" a I sc > 
identified Corey Brooks as the man who returned tc her home when 
she was a 1 one the next morning, January 29, 1991, with the same 
radio, who was wearing "rainbow" sunglasses, pointed an aulomatin 
pistol at her, handcuffed her to the pipes In the bathroom, went 
through the house taking all the jewelry, and spoke on the radio to 
some other person shortly before leaving the home. (Tr. June 1, 
1992, p.64-66). 
Mark McGrath was identified by Glenda Steadman as the man who 
drove Corey Brooks to a store on January 22, 1991, in a red pickup 
truck, and gave her $300.00 to buy a pistol there. (Tr. June 1, 
1992, p.137-141). 
The witness, Bill Anderson, observed a pickup truck parked a 
couple of blocks away from the Vert residence on January 28, 1991. 
He observed a man matching the description of Corey Brooks get out 
of the pickup, walk down the street to the Vert residence, and 
enter the Verts' house the evening Stephanie Vert, her mother and 
her sister said Corey Brooks was talking to Stephanie about the 
purchase of her diamond ring. (Tr. June 1, 1992, p.115-116). 
Significantly, Mr. Anderson thought that a female remained in the 
vehicle on the night in question. He was unsure of the vehicle's 
color. (R.O.A. 490). 
Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker identified Mark McGrath as 
the person who was driving Corey Brooks in a red pickup on January 
29, 1991. They testified Mark McGrath and Corey Brooks stopped at 
the Langenbackers' home, where Corey Brooks showed the witnesses 
some jewelry out of an attache case. (Tr. of June 1, 1992, p.73-
77). Kim Fisher said that some items in the attache case were 
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items on a 1 i st written by Martha Vert as being jewelry that had 
been taken from her Vert home, and, in particular, a marquis cut 
diamond ri ng. Rodney Langenbacker stall «ad t;,naf 1 \r Brooks acini i ttecl 
having committed the robbery after a news account of the robbery 
was broadcast < television. Corey Brooks gave the Langenbackers 
a costume jewelry chain when Rodney told him that the chriin Wii> nut 
real gold. Martha Vert identified the cha i n as part of the jewelry 
that; had hp^n •••ito.lon t rom h*»r, 
Mi . McGrath was not involved in any discussions about theft or 
sale of the jewelry with Kim Fisher or Rodney Langenbacker. (Tr. 
June 1, ] 9 9 2 , p. 7 5 , 1 1 , ] 6 2 4 ' • -: • * i i i H :I 1 IO 
prove at tri a ] was the following: Although Mark McGrath was not 
seen and identified as being at the Vert house January 29, 1991, 
when Corey Brooks entered the house and commit- - • • • r>ei y „ Mai k 
McGrath was identified as being present during all other 
1,1
 s i q n i ti < ant; incidents in preparation I'or the robbery and after the 
robbery for the sale of the jewelry." 
Defendant was represented by Mr. Gilbert Athay, Attorney at 
Law„, at t:l: le tri a] be] ow• • - j evidence came 
before the jury tending ^ indicate tha: -.:.<-. defendant had 
previously been convicted of a crime. Thereafter, the defendant 
asked si an<J i n hi s DWI i belia] f He i u: ider stood 
that the only reason to keep him, off the witness stand would be to 
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avoid an inquiry about his prior criminal history. Mr. Athay told 
the defendant that he would "walk out on him," or words to that 
effect, if the defendant chose to take the witness stand. Fearing 
that he would not have counsel for the remainder of the trial, the 
defendant elected not to testify in his own behalf. He was 
convicted. 
In the course of the trial, Mr. Athay permitted numerous items 
of highly prejudicial and/or inadmissible evidence to come before 
the jury, without objection. The prosecution remarked in opening 
statements that the victim of the crime alleged had been held at 
gunpoint and handcuffed to the pipes in her bathroom. These 
circumstances were wholly irrelevant to defendant's trial, but 
highly prejudicial within the meaning of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. (R.O.A. 422). Mr. Athay did not object. The 
prosecution referred repeatedly to the fact that a robbery victim, 
a young girl, had been handcuffed and held at gunpoint. (R.O.A. 
423). The prosecution itself admitted that Mr. McGrath was not 
involved in the robbery. The prosecutor stated in opening: "There 
will be no evidence to show that Mr. McGrath was involved in that 
robbery." (R.O.A. 426). Mr. Athay still did not object. The 
prosecution testified that, the day before the robbery to which the 
prosecution could never connect the defendant, Mr. McGrath had 
accompanied Glenda Steadman to a pawn shop to purchase a firearm, 
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and that he had been in Corey Brooks Company. This was totally 
irrelevant to the action pending against the defendant, but highly 
prejudicial. (R.O.A. 424). Again, Mr. Athay did not object. 
In the direct examination, of the state's witness, Stephanie 
Vert, the prosecution examined the victim of the robbery, Ms. Vert, 
and showed her State's proposed exhibit number 6, purportedly the 
gun used to hold her during the robbery. (R.O.A. 436). He had Ms. 
Vert testify to the highly prejudicial but irrelevant fact that the 
witness had been held at gunpoint and handcuffed to the bathroom 
pipes underneath the sink in her basement. (R.O.A. 436-437). 
Again, Mr. Athay did not object. 
The prosecution inquired of witnesses Rodney Langenbacker and 
Kim Fisher about a news broadcast regarding the robbery in which 
the defendant was not involved. (R.O.A. 445, 461). The 
information regarding the news broadcast about the robbery was 
highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the trial of the defendant. 
Mr. Athay did not object. 
In the prosecution's case against the defendant here, the 
prosecution examined the witness, Mr. Langenbacker, about receiving 
jewelry from one Corey Brooks, an incident in which Mr. McGrath was 
not involved. The receipt of stolen jewelry by Mr. Langenbacker 
from Corey Brooks was totally irrelevant to the trial of this 
defendant. Mr. Athay did not object. (R.O.A. 458). 
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In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor advised the 
jury, without any evidence to support the statement, of the 
irrelevant fact that Corey Brooks had already been convicted of 
"this crime, that is the robbery." (R.O.A. 693). Mr. Athay did 
not object to this statement, nor move the court for a limiting 
instruction, nor ask for a mistrial. 
In the course of the trial, as referenced above, the 
prosecution impeached its own witness, Ms. Steadman, with a prior 
recorded statement of the witness, which was admissible, if at all, 
for impeachment purposes only, and not for the substance contained 
within that prior recorded statement. Mr. Athay objected after, 
and only after, the conclusion of the trial and the jury verdict. 
(R.O.A. 738). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court had no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. McGrath, 
because Mr. McGrath was not brought to trial within 120 days 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1. 
The State put on a prejudicial and irrelevant "aiding and 
abetting" case when the charge at issue was theft by receiving. 
Defendant did not have effective assistance of counsel, 
because his trial counsel sat back and allowed highly prejudicial 
and totally irrelevant information regarding a crime committed by 
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another person to come before the jury. When the defendant wanted 
to testify in his own behalf in this matter, the defendant did not 
do so, under the duress of the threat that his attorney would not 
continue to represent him in the trial. 
Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed because it was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. The only evidence adduced at 
trial against Mr. McGrath was to the effect that he had once 
accompanied a woman to a pawn shop to purchase a gun, and that he 
had been known to be in the company of Corey Brooks, who later 
perpetrated a robbery. No evidence linked Mr. McGrath with the 
robbery, or with receiving property taken in the course of the 
robbery. 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to 
declare a mistrial after the jury admitted to using non-record 
"evidence" during its deliberation upon the verdict. 
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 
a threat allegedly made by defendant to a witness after his arrest. 
Evidence of the alleged threat was irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial. 
The trial court incorrectly instructed the jury at the 
commencement of the trial that that the defendant was alleged to 
have been armed with a dangerous weapon at the time he committed 
the offense in question. In fact, defendant was not bound over on 
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the weapons charge and no issue of a weapon was before the jury. 
However, this improper charge from the judge at the commencement of 
trial would cause the jury to assume that any evidence presented at 
trial regarding a weapon was somehow relevant to defendant. This 
instruction from the judge prejudiced the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED 
JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE THIS CASE 
BECAUSE MR. McGRATH WAS NOT BROUGHT 
TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS PURSUANT 
TO UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1. 
Under Utah law, an individual who is deprived of his liberty 
by means of incarceration in a state penal institution is entitled 
to be brought to trial within 120 days of the individual's request 
for a disposition of the charges holding the individual. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 provides that: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in a state prison, jail 
or other penal or correctional institution of 
this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver 
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the 
same, a written demand specifying the nature 
of the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of the 
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have 
the charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice. 
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(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer, upon receipt of the demand described 
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the 
demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court 
clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting 
attorney so notified, provide the attorney 
with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall 
be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as 
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for 
good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceeding. 
If the court finds that the failure of the 
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by 
good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall 
order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
This statutory provision has been interpreted on numerous 
occasions by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court stressed that § 77-29-1 "clearly places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecutor." Id. at 424. Since 
the prosecutor did not meet his obligation of due diligence in the 
Petersen case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed Mr. Petersen's 
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conviction and dismissed all charges brought against him because 
Mr. Petersen had not been afforded a trial within 120 days of his 
written notice of disposition. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that: 
nothing in Section 77-29-1, its 
predecessor, or any of the case law under 
either statute requires a showing of prejudice 
in order for the charges against the defendant 
to be dismissed. On the contrary, Section 77-
29-1 clearly provides that if there is not 
good cause for the delay [in bringing the 
defendant to trial within 120 days] the court 
shall order the matter dismissed 
[Further,] it is clear from the record that 
neither of the attorneys nor defendant 
requested or was granted a continuance. 
The rationale supporting the reversal and the dismissal of 
charges in Petersen mandates the same result in the present case. 
In this case, the defendant filed a notice and request for 
disposition of pending charges on March 4, 1991. This notice was 
sent to prosecutors for Salt Lake County, Utah and West Valley 
City, Utah. The defendant called this matter to the court's 
attention at his arraignment and first appearance before Judge 
Moffat. At his arraignment on January 10, 1992, the defendant told 
Judge Moffat that he had filed a 120 day disposition and challenged 
the court's jurisdiction. (R.O.A. 293, 11.14-25). The defendant 
did not come to trial until June 1992, almost fifteen months after 
he submitted the notice and request for disposition, and almost ten 
months after the filing of the Information, all well past the 120-
day limit mandated by statute. The rationale set forth in 
Petersenf supraf mandates a reversal of the lower court's ruling 
and a dismissal of the charges against Mr. McGrath. 
POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME 
OF THEFT BY RECEIVING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
A. In a Prosecution for Theft by Receiving, the 
State Put on an Immaterial Aiding and Abetting 
Case. 
The trial court allowed the State to put on a largely 
irrelevant "aiding and abetting" theft case even though the crime 
bound over to District Court was theft by receiving. Ironically, 
the "aiding and abetting" case was quashed at the preliminary 
hearing, but the prosecution nevertheless chose to (and was allowed 
to) try the quashed charge in the District Court trial. 
The prosecution spent the vast majority of its trial time 
introducing to the jury evidence that one Corey Brooks had robbed 
a home in Salt Lake County, had held a resident in the home at 
gunpoint, had handcuffed her to the pipes in her basement, and had 
taken property from the victims of this robbery. The prosecution, 
in its own opening statement, admitted that it had absolutely no 
evidence linking the defendant, Mr. McGrath, with the robbery. 
Next, the prosecution established that Corey Brooks took 
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certain items taken in the robbery, and presented them to two 
witnesses, Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker. Mr. Langenbacker 
and Ms. Fisher specifically testified that Mr. McGrath was not 
present when the items were offered to them, had nothing to do with 
offering the items for sale, and was merely present with Corey 
Brooks. Absolutely no one testifying in behalf of the prosecution 
placed the stolen property in the hands of the defendant. 
There is not sufficient evidence against the defendant to pass 
constitutional muster. The defendant cannot have been found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law upon the status of the 
evidence adduced at trial. The burden was effectively shifted to 
defendant to come up with an excuse for why he was seen with Corey 
Brooks. 
POINT III. MR. McGRATH#S CONVICTION SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL WAS SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED BY 
EXTENSIVE AND PERVASIVE PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee an 
accused the fundamental right to a fair trial. Amendment XIV, 
United States Constitution; Article I, Section 7 and 12, Utah 
Constitution. Prosecutors in this state and across the country are 
charged with the special duty of insuring that criminal defendants 
receive a fair trial. In the words of the Utah Supreme Court: 
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We have previously stated that the 
[prosecutor] while charged with vigorously 
enforcing the laws has the duty to not only 
secure appropriate convictions but an even 
higher duty to see that justice is done. In 
his role as the State's representative in 
criminal matters, the prosecutor, therefore, 
must not only attempt to win cases, but must 
see that justice is done. Thus, while he 
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor, 
it is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
means to bring about a just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). 
A corresponding and long-standing precept of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence insists that prosecutors must not employ arguments 
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury, nor 
direct the jurors away from their duty to decide the case on 
anything other than the evidence before them. Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also ABA Standards of Criminal 
Justice 3-5.8(c) and (d), 3-6.1(3) (2nd ed. 1980), Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct
 f Rule 3.4(e); and Code of Professional 
Responsibility, DR7-106(c)(7). 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also indicate that 
prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical and 
decorous manner. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 provides, "A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate." Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 
provides in part, "A lawyer shall not . . . (e) In trial, allude to 
any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is 
relevant." (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, the prosecutor violated Rule 3.4 and 
seriously prejudiced Mr- McGrath's right to a fair trial when he 
(1) referred repeatedly to patently inadmissible but highly 
inflammatory evidence, and (2) used evidence impeaching his own 
witness as though it was substantive testimony. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for 
gauging the impropriety of (and reversal necessitated by) a 
prosecutor's remarks. State v. Valdez. 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973); 
State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson. 663 
P. 2d 48 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. 
Roberts, 711 P.2d 235,239 (Utah 1985); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 
750 (Utah 1982); State v. Gaxiolar 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering their verdict, and [2] were they, 
under the circumstances of the particular 
case, probably influenced by those remarks. 
Valdez. 513 P.2d at 426. See also State v. Palmer. 218 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1993). Applying this test to the facts of this 
case demonstrates the reversible error was committed by the 
prosecutor and the trial court. 
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Given the conflicting and tenuous nature of the evidence here, 
it is more likely that the jury was swayed by the prosecutor's 
improper statements: 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on 
their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced 
through the remarks of counsel. Indeed, in 
such cases, the jurors may be searching for 
guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible 
to influence, and a small degree of influence 
may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid. 
as far as possible, any reference to those 
matters the jury is not justified in 
considering. 
Troy 688 P.2d at 486-87 (emphasis added); accord, State v. 
Andreasonr 718 P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986). The danger of harm 
from prejudicial closing arguments is higher than for other aspects 
of the trial because of the close proximity between summation and 
the jury's deliberations. Therefore, the burden is on the State to 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misconduct was 
not prejudicial under the second prong of the Troy reversal test. 
State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986) [citing 
Chapman v. CaliforniaP 386 U.S. 18 (1967)]. At least two instances 
of constitutional prejudice occurred in this case. 
A. Mr. McGrath's Due Process Right to an 
Impartial Jury was Undermined by the 
Prosecutor's Improper Trial Tactics. 
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Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee Mr. 
McGrath the due process right to be tried by an impartial jury. 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; Article I, Section 12, 
Utah Constitution. Mr. McGrath was deprived of this right when the 
prosecutor put on an irrelevant and highly prejudicial "aiding and 
abetting" theft case. The prosecutor essentially tried Corey 
Brooks for robbery and then coincidentally told the jury that Mr. 
McGrath had been hanging around Corey Brooks near the time of the 
robbery. In the present case, the prosecutor's deliberate 
reference to immaterial evidence likely undermined the jury's 
impartiality. As noted previously, the theme throughout the trial 
and the prosecutor's closing was that Mr. McGrath was guilty by 
association. To develop this theme, the prosecutor improperly 
delved constantly into irrelevant facts pertinent only to Corey 
Brooks' prosecution. Corey Brooks' egregious activities, and even 
his gun, were paraded in front of the jurors for the deliberate 
purpose of alarming them and tainting Mr. McGrath's prosecution. 
Based on Ruiz, Andreason and Johnson, supra. Mr. McGrath's 
conviction should be reversed on the grounds that he was deprived 
of his due process right to an impartial jury. 
B. The Prosecutor's Use of Impeachment 
Testimony as Substantive Evidence was 
Prejudicial Misconduct. 
Deliberate misrepresentation of facts in evidence during a 
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prosecutor's summation can rise to the level of a due process 
violation. United State v. Ruizf 711 F.Supp. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y 
1989), aff'd 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990). In State v. Andreason. 
718 P. 2d 400 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction because of improper argument by the prosecutor: 
The jury's attention was clearly called to 
matters outside the evidence of the case, 
e.g., that defendant's alleged conduct was 
"persuasive, " [and] that others were involved 
in similar conduct . . . . 
What others, i.e., Corey Brooks did or did not do was not in 
evidence and was certainly not relevant to defendant's guilt or 
innocence. State v. Johnsonr 663 P.2d at 51. Consequently, the 
jury was not justified in considering the statement. 
Id. at 402 (emphasis added). 
C. The Prosecutor's Conduct Constitutes Plain 
Error. 
Litigants are precluded from asserting a claim on appeal for 
the first time unless the trial court committed plain error. State 
v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be able 
to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error. The 
second requirement for finding of plain error 
is that the error affect the substantial 
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be 
harmful. 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 
814, (1989) (cites omitted). In appropriate cases, the court may 
"dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that justice can 
be done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or 
counsel proves harmful in retrospect." Id. at 35, n.8. The 
prosecutor's conduct in this case should be reviewed on appealed 
under the plain error doctrine. 
i. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Plain. 
The prosecutor openly stated in closing (1) that appellant 
committed theft by receiving when all that was shown was evidence 
of Corey Brook's robbery (2) that Corey Brooks was already found 
guilty, and (3) that Ms. Steadman's impeachment testimony could be 
considered by the jury as substantive evidence. The trial court 
should have recognized that impropriety of these statements and 
instructed the jury to disregard the. 
In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah April 7, 
1992), the prosecutor improperly commented on a prior forgery 
conviction and indicated that the defendant was prone to taking 
advantage of his family. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
This comment clearly urged the jury to view 
Emmett as a person who commits crimes against 
his family and to use this characteristic as 
evidence that Emmett sodomized his son. 
Therefore, the comments are in direct 
violation of rules 404 and 609. Given the 
clarity of the law in this and the blatant 
nature of the prosecutor's statements, it 
should have been obvious to the trial court 
that the prosecutor's remarks called to the 
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juror's attention matters they were not 
justified in considering. 
Id. at 35. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal matters is at least as fundamental as rules 404 and 609. 
See Utah Code Ann § 76-1-501 (1990 Repl. Vol.). The prosecutor's 
misconduct in the instant case is at least as blatant as that in 
Emmett. 
ii. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Harmful. 
The prosecutor's statements were harmful. The jury 
deliberated for many hours on the question of Mr. McGrath's alleged 
complicity in Corey Brooks' crime before rendering a verdict of 
guilty. 
The United States Supreme court has explicitly held that the 
reasonable doubt standard has constitutional ramifications; 
Lest there remain any doubt about the 
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt 
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constituted the crime with which he is 
charged. 
Sandstrom v. Montanaf 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979) (quoting In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, (1970)). 
Since the prosecutor cannot prove his comments were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1373, appellant 
is entitled to a new trial. 
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It has also been recognized that objections may serve to 
exaggerate the harm sought to be avoided. Seef e.g., United States 
v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (1980), cert denied. 449 U.S. 1113, 
(1981) ("no objection is required when the prejudice cannot be 
corrected or when objection would exaggerate it") (citing United 
States v. Youngf 463 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States 
v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated on 
other grounds, 598 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). This Court itself 
has recognized that curative instructions are not always effective. 
Peters
 f 796 P.2d at 712. Accord, State v. Franks, 445 P.2d 200 
(Wash 1968); State v. Claflin. 690 P.2d 1186 (Wash. App. 1984). 
Not even appellate judges can be so naive as 
really to believe that all twelve jurors 
succeeded in performing what Judge L. Hand 
aptly called "a mental gymnastic which is 
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody 
elses." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 
(2nd Cir. 1932). 
United States v. Bozzar 365 F.2d 206, 215 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL 
AFTER THE JURY ADMITTED TO USING NON-RECORD 
"EVIDENCE" DURING ITS DELIBERATION UPON THE 
VERDICT. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, the prosecution was 
allowed to impeach its own witness with a transcript and tape-
recording of a prior statement inconsistent to the witness's 
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statement at trial* The transcript of that in consistent statement 
was never admitted as an exhibit at trial, and did not constitute 
evidence of any kind at trial, other than for consideration of 
impeachment purposes. The trial court specifically ruled that the 
"handouts" consisting of the transcript of the tape-recording would 
be picked up and would not go into the jury room. (R.O.A. 686). 
Nevertheless, it came to the attention of the court after the 
jury had started deliberations that the transcripts of Ms. 
Steadman's conversation had been taken into the jury room, despite 
the fact that they did not constitute trial evidence. The court 
described this situation as "unfortunate." (R.O.A. 731). The 
court acknowledged that it was the trial court's "oversight" that 
the trial court did not advise the bailiff that she should not 
permit those transcripts in the jury room during the deliberations. 
The jury submitted a note, in the course of deliberations, to the 
court, inquiring how they should review and treat the transcripts. 
Mr. Athay objected to the circumstances under which the jury 
was permitted to receive and review the transcript, and moved the 
court for a mistrial. (R.O.A. 731). 
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. (R.O.A. 733). 
It was plain error for the trial court to refuse to permit the 
transcripts into the jury room during deliberations. It was 
further plain error for the trial court to fail to grant a 
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mistrial, after it was discovered that the jury had had highly 
prejudicial material not admitted as evidence in the case in the 
jury room during deliberation. 
POINT V. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
The defendant raises the argument of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for the first time on appeal. Defendant acknowledges that 
an appellant typically cannot raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for the first time on appeal due to the fact that the 
trial record is insufficient to allow the claim to be determined by 
the appellate court. See State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953 
(Ut. App., 1993). See also State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027# 1029 
(Utah, 1991). This claim can be raised, however, if the trial 
record is adequate in order to permit determination of the issue by 
the appellate court and where there is new counsel on appeal. Id.r 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Ut. App., 1991). The trial 
record in this instance is adequate in order to permit such review 
and determination. Further, the defendant is represented by new 
counsel. It is appropriate for this Court to reach the merits of 
the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The defendant's denial of effective assistance resulted in 
part from trial counsel's failure to permit defendant to testify at 
the time of trial. Defendant told his counsel that he wanted to 
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testify and inform the jury where he was, physically, at the time 
of the crime. He also wanted to tell the jury that he was merely 
giving a ride to Corey Brooks, rather than actively involved in any 
illegal activity. Further, the failure on the part of defense 
counsel to allow defendant to testify was exacerbated by the fact 
that his counsel told him that he would withdraw as counsel if he 
insisted on testifying. Defendant felt coerced into not testifying 
and was unable to provide appropriate alibi testimony. (See 
affidavit of Mark Edward McGrath, which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference and designated as appendix "A.") 
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a "two prong" 
analytical framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims brought under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. In order for the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to succeed, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel 
made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 
1993), at 354. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, at 687, 
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(1984). The United States Supreme Court has also stated in 
Strickland that a defendant must overcome "a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." 
This Court should find as a matter of law that the defendant's 
trial counsel's performance was clearly deficient. Defendant's 
counsel may have wanted to prevent defendant's testimony in order 
to avoid admission of prior convictions, but those admissions may 
have already been known to the jury and would have been offset by 
the alibi testimony and deiendant's explanation of his whereabouts 
and lack of involvement. Certainly, defendant's counsel's decision 
was not reasonable trial strategy. 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court must be deferential in 
its review of trial counsel's performance so that it does not 
"second guess" counsel's actions based on a lifeless record. State 
v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 466, (Utah App. 1993). However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has also acknowledged the importance of a 
defendant's right to testify and provide alibi evidence. See State 
v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). Defendant's counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
when he threatened to withdraw as defendant's counsel if defendant 
insisted on his right to provide alibi testimony and testify on his 
own behalf. Defendant's counsel's threats, which did prevent 
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defendant from testifying, were a breach of counsel's duty of 
loyalty to defendant under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and that abandonment of duty constitutes ineffective 
assistance. (See State v. Holland. 230 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1994). 
Counsel's omission in failing to allow defendant to testify and 
counsel's affirmative act in threatening to withdraw fall well 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 
Strickland. 466 U.S., at 690, State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 
1986). 
The second prong of the "two prong" test of Strickland 
requires that the defendant show the deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense. However, if counsel's performance is 
clearly deficient and prejudice cannot be determined from the 
record, a remand is appropriate. See, for example, State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858-59 (Utah App. 1992), cert, den., 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Further, there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for 
counsel's errors, the result at the trial level would have been 
different. Strickland,. 466 U.S. at 694; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
competency and reliability of the verdict." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
A somewhat similar but less egregious fact situation occurred 
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previously and was addressed by this court in the matter of State 
v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1988). In that case, the 
defendant appealed his conviction of aggravated arson based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel. One of the specific omissions 
that defendant claimed was prejudicial was that the defendant's 
counsel did not understand a rule of evidence and thereby prevented 
the defendant from testifying in his own behalf. Defendant claimed 
that he could explain his whereabouts prior to the first fire which 
occurred. In analyzing the facts of the case, the court in 
Morehouse explained that the focus of the prosecution was on the 
second fire rather than the first fire and that, also, several 
witnesses testified at trial as to the defendant's movements and 
whereabouts. Further, had the defendant testified he would have 
been subject to cross examination of the evidence given by those 
witnesses and inconsistencies in statements would have developed. 
Further, the court stated that the jury would have been told, at 
the very least, that he had previously been convicted of a felony. 
Morehouse, at 219-220. In that case, the defendant did have a long 
criminal record involving convictions for several felonies and two 
prior incarcerations. Pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, prior convictions may be elicited to attack credibility 
in certain instances. In Morehouse, the court determined that it 
was "difficult to see how the defendant's failure to testify leads 
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to a reasonable probability that the result would have been 
different. Again, counsel's decision falls within the wide 
latitude of legitimate trial tactics." Id. at 220. In Morehousef 
however, there was no act on the part of defendant's counsel to 
affirmatively threaten to withdraw as counsel if defendant failed 
to abide by his recommendations. Further, Justice Jackson, in his 
dissent, properly analyzed the representation of the trial counsel 
and determined that it was demonstrably incompetent. Morehouse, at 
222. Justice Jackson refers to the fact that the defendant's 
counsel in that case admitted his legal error in misunderstanding 
the applicable rules of evidence, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, 
and its effect on the defendant in that case. Morehouse, at 221. 
Given that the defendant in that case could tell the jury where he 
was and what he was doing at the time of the initial fire and that 
only he could share with the jury this first person account, it was 
Justice Jackson reasoned decision that his attorney deprived him of 
his constitutional right to testify. Morehouse, at 220. Justice 
Jackson went on to analyze whether the deficiency of counsel was 
prejudicial to appellant and concluded that there was a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been different if 
counsel had competently understood the rules of evidence and not 
kept the defendant from testifying. Morehousef at 223. 
In the instant case, the defendant could provide credible 
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alibi testimony as well as an explanation of why he was where he 
was at the time of the incident, during periods of preparation for 
the robbery and after the robbery. The jury would not, in all 
probability, have convicted the defendant absent the failures and 
omissions of defendant's counsel. It is clear from the face of the 
record that defendant's counsel's actions were prejudicial to the 
defendant. Defendant has met both prongs of the Strickland test. 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for 
a new trial. 
Setting aside the issue of the defendant's trial counsel's 
actions in preventing the defendant from testifying, defendant's 
trial counsel still did not render effective assistance of counsel 
in the trial court. Specifically, as noted in the Statement of 
Facts above, defendant's counsel permitted prosecution to present 
highly prejudicial and totally irrelevant evidence, regarding a 
violent and disturbing crime of a third party, Mr. Corey Brooks, to 
the jury. The jury heard repeatedly that the victim of Mr. Brooks' 
robbery, a sympathetic young woman, had been held at gunpoint and 
handcuffed to the pipes in her basement. The jury even saw the 
weapon purported to be the weapon used in that offense. The 
prosecutor alluded to this robbery repeatedly. The prosecutor 
elicited testimony from two witnesses about a news report regarding 
the robbery, and the fact that the news report was broadcast in 
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their home at about the time Mr. McGrath was seen in the company of 
Corey Brooks. The prosecutor adduced testimony from Glenda 
Steadman that Mr. McGrath had accompanied her when she bought a 
handgun. Finally, the prosecution eventually referred to the 
robbery at trial before the jury, "this crime" as "the robbery." 
In other words, the prosecution led the jury to believe that the 
crime to be considered by the jury was the robbery, and not theft 
by receiving. 
All of this evidence came in over the course of three days of 
trial without a single objection from defendant's counsel to the 
relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, or to the prejudicial effect of this evidence, 
pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Clearly, 
counsel's failure to object to these repeated references, to the 
robbery, the gun and the news broadcast, and other conduct of Corey 
Brooks, falls below any objective standard for performance of trial 
counsel in a criminal case. It meets the first prong of 
Strickland,, supra. 
Further, it is clear that all of this evidence prejudiced the 
trial of the defendant in the trial court. Defendant's counsel 
permitted the prosecution to try Mr. Brooks for robbery and not to 
try Mr. McGrath for receiving stolen property. Had the prosecution 
been held to the crime charged and the defendant on trial, the 
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outcome at trial may well have been a verdict of not guilty. 
POINT VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RECEIVING 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT, 
IMMATERIAL AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO 
MR. McGRATH'S CASE? 
During the course of the trial, the jury heard the testimony 
of Glenda Steadman. Eventually, Ms. Steadman was permitted by the 
trial court to testify that she had been threatened by the 
defendant after his arrest for the charge at issue. (R.O.A. 470). 
This testimony occurred over the repeated objection of defendant's 
trial counsel. (R.O.A. 470). 
Testimony that the defendant had allegedly made the threats to 
claimed the witness as was wholly irrelevant to the question of the 
defendants guilt or innocence of theft by receiving. (Rules of 
Evidence 402). Even if it was relevant, it was so prejudicial as 
not to be admissible in the trial court, pursuant to Rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, the trial court permitted 
evidence of this alleged threat to come before the jury. This 
constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989). 
POINT VII. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR INCORRECTLY CHARGING THE JURY? 
The trial court, in advising the jury at the outset of the 
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case of the charges pending against the defendant, stated as 
follows: 
" . . . in that the defendant, Mark Edward 
McGrath, a party to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property, aided in 
concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Stephanie Vert, knowing that the 
property had been stolen or believing that it 
probably had been stolen and/or concealed, 
sold or withheld the property of Stephanie 
Vert, knowing the property had been stolen 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof 
and that at the time of the theft, Mark Edward 
McGrath was armed with a dangerous weapon, to 
wit: a gun, and that the value of said 
property exceeded $1,000.00 to which the 
defendant has plead not guilty." (R.O.A. 
416). 
In reading this information to the jury, the judge confused 
charges which had been bound over for prosecution after the 
preliminary hearing with those which had not been bound over. 
Effectively, the judge admonished the jury at the outset that this 
case somehow involved Mark Edward McGrath's alleged use of a 
dangerous weapon in the course of a theft or robbery. In fact, Mr. 
McGrath had been bound over for receiving stolen property, a second 
degree felony. He was not bound over on any gun count. 
The court committed plain error, by instructing and 
admonishing the jury at the very outset of the trial that the issue 
of Mr. McGrath's alleged possession of a weapon or use of a weapon 
was in any way involved in this case. Obviously, the jury was 
confused about this issue. The jury submitted a question to the 
court about how to respond to this jury charge • A true and correct 
copy of that jury question is attached as Appendix "B," and is 
found at 182 of the R.O.A. 
It is clear that this is of more serious concern when one 
considers the prosecution's repeated efforts, later in the case, to 
link defendant McGrath to the robbery committed by Corey Brooks, 
merely by association with Corey Brooks. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant alleges that this Court must dismiss the charges 
against him under Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1 (1953 as amended). In 
the alternative, appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this day of April, 1994. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered seven 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies to the 
JAN GRAHAM, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this day of April, 1994• 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 92049-CA 
-vs-
MARK EDWARD McGRATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, MARK EDWARD McGRATH, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. Affiant is the defendant/appellant to the above-entitled 
action, and is over the age of twenty-one years. 
2. Affiant, in preparation for trial, and at the time of 
trial, informed his counsel that he wanted to testify. Affiant's 
counsel told him not to testify. Affiant wanted to tell the jury 
where he was at the time of the crime. He also wanted to tell the 
jury that he was merely giving Corey Brooks a ride and had no 
involvement with the criminal activity. Affiant had numerous 
receipts and other documents indicating where he was at the given 
times which could have been admitted to evidence if he had 
testified* 
3. Affiant and his counsel had numerous arguments about 
whether it was appropriate for affiant to testify. Discussions 
were had not only with his counsel, but with his family. The 
discussions culminated at the time of trial. Affiant insisted to 
his counsel that he wished to testify. Affiant's counsel said that 
he would "walk" if affiant insisted on testifying. The affiant 
felt very coerced into not testifying. It was his counsel's 
threats to withdraw if he insisted on testifying that finally 
resulted in his decision not to testify, based upon his fears of 
being abandoned by counsel. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
^< x/'Ji4-
V 
MARK EDWARD McGRATH 
Defendant/Appellant 
ON THE y day of April, 1994, personally appeared 
before me, the undersigned notary, MARK EDWARD McGRATH, the signer 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose. 
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